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WHETHERitis "good business" to make a decision that helps toward
economic stabilization is bound to depend partly on government
policies in taxation, accounting rules, monetary arrangements, and
the like. In terms of business cycle theory, the amplitude of fluctua-
tions hinges largely on the sharpness of the "business response
mechanism."
Thinking about government stabilization policy naturally focuses
on ways to influence the "disturbances" to which business responds.
Thinking about business policies that might contribute to stabiliza-
tion focuses on what businessmen can do within an existing context.
The topic of this paper is the area between—what government can
do to enlarge what business can do toward economic stabilization.
To avoid drifting into a discussion of stabilization policy at large,
I propose to limit myself to standing arrangements (as distinct from
ad hoc measures), and to measures that affect business incentives
in a given market situation (as distinct from measures that act
directly on the market situation). In the monetary field, however,
my discussion bulges out slightly beyond these limits.
Strengthening Incentives
By way of clearing the ground, we should draw a clear distinction
between proposals for regularization and proposals for intensifying
business incentives to invest or to offer employment. At this point,
the economist diverges from the journalists and politicians who tend
to set up as sovereign remedy for either inflation or unemployment
a policy of enlarging business profits and increasing the availability
of capital funds. Policies that have a general bias in favor of larger
profits are perhaps more likely to be destabilizing than stabilizing,
since they are apt to favor relying on current profits for financing
and bunching investment more and more in peak periods.
It should be said, however, that intensifying incentives could con-
tribute to regularization if linked with tough restrictions on invest-
ment. One possible regularization strategy is to cultivate an excess
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of demand over productive capacity and choke oft part of the
demand by direct controls—i.e., run a perpetual repressed inflation.
Such intensification of incentives to invest could lead to regulariza-
tion of investment by creating a queue of demanders for buildings,
equipment, and so forth. In view of American attitudes toward
direct controls, and of the well-known drawbacks of repressed
inflation, it is hard to imagine our country deliberately adopting this
strategy. The only way one can imagine our adopting itis to be
forced into it—by devastation in case of war, or by an intense push
toward industrial and residential decentralization for fear of atomic
bombing.
Another possible regularization policy more compatible with
American traditions would be to stimulate business investment and
then use restrictive monetary policy (rather than direct controls) to
screen out excess investment demand. This model is much like the
image economists used to have of the role of investment banking in
pacing investment to match "real" savings. If in any given period
there were a constant backlog of profitable projects awaiting financ-
ing (held back, that is, by some combination of informal capital
rationing and high interest rates), we could hope to regularize in-
vestment by calling projects up a little faster. Unfortunately, the
real-life financial mechanism of a free enterprise economy tends to
let through an inflationary volume of projects in boom times, and
to end up without a backlog. But if the advocates of "strengthening
business incentives" simultaneously advocated reforms to make
monetary controls fully effective, they would have a policy combina-
tion of considerable promise.
Government Finance Possibilities
A number of public finance proposals point toward making it better
business to regularize investment. Built-in fiscal flexibility (a struc-
ture that automatically tends toward deficit in recession and toward
surplus in recovery) would encourage stability. Its stabilizing effect
via consumer expenditure is ruled out of this discussion as being a
"market" measure. But its tendency to reduce fluctuations in retained
profits may be classified as an incentive measure.
A fascinating question is whether a special tax could create
incentives to abate inventory fluctuations. It is easy to set up a recipe
for a tax with appropriate incentive effects. An example would be a
tax at a substantial rate (25 per cent, say) to be applied each quarter
to the value of any increase or decrease in each firm's inventory,
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compared with the same date a year previously. Presumably, small
changes (less than 5 per cent of the base inventory, say) would be
exempt.' At the cost of some complication, the regularization char-
acteristics of the tax could be improved by raising the exempt per-
centage of increase whenever unemployment exceeded a stated
level. My rather fragmentary knowledge of the problems of valua-
tion, administration, and compliance involved suggests that this
scheme is impractical; but some students of the problem are more
optimistic.2
Another interesting-if-feasible project is to design a tax on price
increases. In times of expansion or boom, the stabilization charac-
teristics of the economy are apt to be better if firms confronted with
increased demand do not resort to price increases too readily. So
long as sellers can fill orders at existing prices by taking up unem-
ployed resources, society gains by having them do so. As bottlenecks
appear, it may be desirable from the standpoint of resource alloca-
tion to have price increases at the tightest points. But on the whole,
the tendency of many sellers to lengthen delivery dates and fatten
their order books is probably a healthy one.3 If the growth of
demand proves transitory, the period of full-volume operations is
apt to be prolonged, and there will be longer notice of the exhaustion
of the extra demand. Accordingly, a tax on the gross proceeds of any
price increase might be very desirable. But I suspect that such a
tax would shatter on the difficulty of evaluating quality changes,
and hence of measuring price increases in individual cases.4
Merit-rating systems of unemployment compensation may be sig-
nificant from the standpoint of business regularization incentives.
1Suchan exemption would avoid putting tax penalties on normal growth,
gradual liquidation, or trends in business policy concerning inventories. The
number of taxpayers could be further reduced, and growth of small firms en-
couraged, by exempting a moderate dollar amount of change per firm, even
though it exceeded the exempt percentage.
2See,for instance, the comment below by D. G. Tyndall.
The economic-stabilization characteristics of this response would be still
better if an increase of orders on the books led to a tying up of liquid funds—
for instance, if sellers took substantial payments on order, but were obliged to
impound them in liquid form rather than add these receipts to working capital.
There may be scope here for social invention; but I have been unable to frame
a rule that sounds workable to govern such deposits.
4Index-numbercalculation, as I understand it, deliberately concentrates on
a small number of prices for which quality specifications are unusually definite.
A tax of this sort would have to cope with the hard cases as well as the easy
ones—in the face of a substantial incentive to confuse the issue by linking price
rises with changes in quality.
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I share the view of many economists that the countercyclical fluctua-
tion of employers' contributions implicit in the schemes of most
states is objectionable. But as Drs. Schmidt and Abramovitz pointed
out in discussing the original version of this paper, a merit-rating
scheme may have the effect of subjecting an employer to a fairly
substantial fine for a specific layoff of workers. This effect (or a
dismissal compensation scheme) may swing the balance in favor of
meeting fluctuations of demand by stockpiling output, rather than
by having a margin of plant capacity and letting output and employ-
ment fluctuate. It also points toward force-account investment in
slack times as a way to use workers to whom an employer is com-
mitted.
On the expenditure side of public finance, there is a whole family
of plans for government stockpiling. These plans are primarily on
the market rather than the incentive side, and thus need only inci-
dental mention here. But it should be mentioned that any such plan
tends to make it safer to hold inventories of the commodities
affected. For highly standardized commodities, therefore, we can
be sure that to introduce a government demand for inventory will
not cause an equal reduction in private demand for inventory and
will have a net stabilizing effect. I am more skeptical, however,
about proposals (such as that of Lerner and Graham) to generalize
the stockpiling idea by offering to buy unsold storable goods at
direct cost. Government stocks of unstandardized goods could be
cleared only through the normal channels of their producers and
would thus "overhang the market" just as much as private stocks.
In effect, the scheme is no more than an offer to finance inventory
accumulation, and this is not enough to keep a flagging of orders
from reducing production schedules.
The most important fiscal possibilities for investment regulariza-
tion probably lie in the corporate income tax. Not every change here
is an improvement. A sterling example of the fallacy I referred to
above, of identifying incentive intensification with stabilization, is
the proposal for optional timing of depreciation. This would clearly
encourage bunching investment outlays in years when investment
could be charged off against profit. A two-edged change has been
the introduction of lifo accounting for inventory. Thinking in terms
of lifo is an antidote to the tendency to mistake fictitious inventory
gains and losses for real swings in earnings, and thus to feel unduly
complacent on the upswing and unduly discouraged on the down-
swing. On the other hand, paying taxes in terms of lifo rather than
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fifo means less taxes on an upswing and more on a downswing, and
thus increases the bunching of internal finance possibilities at the
crest of the cycle. Whether official sanction of lifo does more good
under the first head than harm under the second is hard to guess.
Averaging income over good and bad years for tax purposes
should tend to regularize investment, since it reduces the danger
that depreciation may run to waste if a depression occurs after a
large investment. But here, as with lifo, there is a problem of the
date when funds become available. The recent tendency in tax
legislation has been to average by carrying forward past losses and
setting them against present profits. The resulting tax benefits take
the form of tax abatement in the early years of a prosperity. From
the standpoint of regularization characteristics, averaging by carry-
ing back current losses and setting them against previous profits is
more attractive. This system involves a sobering absorption of funds
into the Treasury in high prosperity, offset by refunds when depres-
sion sets up losses. One's judgment on this problem must hinge
largely on the question of whether greater availability of funds early
in a depression would help signfficantly to combat the contraction of
investment. (I opine that it would, but do not pretend my argument
is conclusive.) Weight must be given also to the fact that carry-
forward is more helpful to new firms, and carry-back to moribund
firms. But I suspect that the superior time shape of the flow of tax
funds under carry-back has not been given the weight it deserves in
framing tax policy.
Monetary Possibilities
By general consent, one of the great destabilizing forces in our
economy is the relation between banking and business. If business
is guided on the upswing by the belief that it will prove easy to
borrow, and on the downswing by the belief that bankers are un-
willing to lend, the amplitude of fluctuations is bound to be en-
larged.
A partial remedy for this source of instability is to continue the
post-1933 trend toward cyclically insensitive standards of bank
supervision, and toward amortized loans without lump-sum maturi-
ties. More fundamental would be a convincing demonstration that
henceforth the authorities will keep bank reserves tight in booms
and avoid pinching them in depressions. Unfortunately, the record
(including that of recent years) encourages the expectation that the
authorities will conduct an easy-money policy in booms, and tighten
up (if ever) in recessions.
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Influences on Expect ations
The context of business decisions includes the influence of govern-
ment on expectations—not merely through forecasts of future condi-
tions, but above all, through indications about future government
actions. Analysis of the fiscal and monetary possibilities sketched
above will show that if the timing of their results is satisfactory, it
will be because of the expectations they set up. There are also a
few other influences acting through expectations that need analysis.
Our recent patterns of policy toward wages and farm prices lead
periodically to situations where increases of 10 per cent or more are
visibly in the making for a few months preceding their announce-
ment. Such an expectation of imminent cost increases makes it
apparently foolproof to stock up, and rash to postpone buying, and
thus can generate top-heavy inventory booms. Experience in 1936-
1987 and since the war suggests that this sort of environment warps
business decisions in a destabilizing direction.
More generally, the context of business decisions will depend
largely on the business view about the design and effectiveness of
the government's stabilization policy. If fluctuations are apt to be
severe, a recession is a moment to suspend investment; a boom is a
time when investment is in arrears, and must be hurried forward. If
fluctuations are known to be under control, a slump is an oppor-
tunity to invest at reduced cost and with reduced interference with
regular operations. On the whole, then, if businessmen think regu-
larization is succeeding, they will tend to plan their business bets so
as to help toward regularization; if they are skeptical that regulariza-
tion is succeeding, they will place their bets so as to make regulariza-
tion more
It is tempting to infer (with Beveridge) that the way to make
regularization easy is to enlist the support of business expectations
by announcing regularization. Unfortunately, economic life is full of
surprises. If we rely too heavily on this announcement effect, the
surprises that ensue will be apt to convince the public that regu-
larization policy is ill designed or ill executed. The only secure way
to operate is with a margin of safety—both in the range of tolerance
An important exception is embodied in Vickrey's Paradox. It seems likely
that much of the present-day demand for cash balances rests on fears of a
depression. If these fears were allayed, release of excess cash might prove
seriously inflationary. So "the problem of stabilization isfirst to stabilize in
the face of the public's doubts that it can be done, then to keep stability from
being overthrown by the public's belief that it has been achieved." We must
hope confidence will not spread too suddenly.
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for fluctuations in output and prices, and in the measures adopted
to keep the economy within this range of tolerance. A somewhat
wider range of fluctuations in output than we have experienced since
World War II (and a narrower range of price fluctuations) should
be officially recognized as tolerable. Measures adopted should be
strong enough to keep fluctuations within tolerance limits even
though many business firms bet that these limits will be exceeded.
Once experience has proved to businessmen that regularization
policy is working, we can hope that business responses will carry
much of the load.
COMMENT
BERT C. HICKMAN, National Bureau of Economic Research
One important effect of government policy can hardly be over-
emphasized. If the cost aspects of investment could be raised in
importance relative to its revenue aspects, it should help promote
regularization. If businessmen could be induced to use a longer
pay-off period in their calculatiops, the state of product demand in
the near future would be less important relative to the supply prices
of assets. If businessmen are convinced that declines in g.n.p. and
employment of severe duration or amplitude will be prevented by
public policy, they will think in terms of a longer investment horizon
and will not fear cyclical declines in demand as much as they now
do. Since costs of capital goods vary directly with the cycle, invest-
ment would be discouraged in expansions and encouraged in con-
tractions. Thus greater cyclical regularization of private investment
is a likely by-product of public contracyclical policy.
DAvm CORDON TYNDALL, American President Lines
Professor Hart mentions, as a "dramatic example" of the possibilities
of regularization of business investment, a tax on inventory change
but then dismisses the "gadget" as "unadministrable." I would argue
that the plan is by no means unadministrable and that, if its full
effectiveness is to be realized, the tax should apply to deviations of
gross investment in plant and equipment from the average of the
preceding (say) five years, as well as to inventory changes. This
form of the tax, however, would have the disadvantage of penalizing
rapidly expanding firms. On this and other grounds there would be
distinct advantage in a variant of Professor Hart's tax, namely, a
tax on gross investment (including change in inventory) that would
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be varied with the level of unemployment in the economy: it would
be negative when unemployment is high, positive when unemploy-
ment falls below the "inflation-producing" level.
I have discussed elsewhere (Journal of Finance, December 1949)
the advantages of such a tax over more orthodox fiscal and monetary
devices and some of the administrative problems connected with
such a tax. I will only point out here that, whichever variant is
used and whether the tax is applied only to the inventory change or to
a broader base, the valuation problem to which Professor Hart avers
can be solved easily (though perhaps not optimally) by following
the practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The determination
of costs, which are deductible from gross revenue for purposes of
computing income subject to tax, implicitly determines change in
inventory and other categories of gross investment. Of course, there
would be administrative problems with this, as with any other, tax,
but there is no reason to believe that they would be insuperable.
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